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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last forty-two years, the tobacco industry has enjoyed a practical
immunity from legal responsibility for the devastating health consequences of its
1
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product. At least 350,000 Americans die from smoking each year.' For comparison,
three DC-10 aircraft would have to crash every day for a year to approximate the
same number of deaths.2 Yet the designers, manufacturers, and distributors of
tobacco products have avoided liability with a consistency that can only be
characterized as astounding. This immunity from liability has been the result of
several factors-the tobacco industry's unrelenting strategy of fighting every case to
the very end; billions of dollars spent to hire the top litigators in the country to
defend the industry; brilliant litigation strategies to destroy plaintiffs' claims before
they were ever allowed to go before a jury; the reluctance ofjudges and legislators
to bankrupt the industry; and, as revealed in the recent discovery of industry
documents, an adroit use of fraud, deceit, and conspiracy.
Recent legal developments and public revelations concerning the tobacco
industry have completely changed the scope and viability of tort claims by smokers.
The discovery and publication of the tobacco industry's own internal documents
have effectively nullified the industry's most steadfast defenses and opened the door
to new claims which could force the entire industry into bankruptcy. In the 1970s
and 1980s, asbestos manufacturers saw the awesome power of the American tort
system annihilate an entire industry in the span of a few short years. The ghosts of
asbestos, coupled with the recent developments, have forced the tobacco industry
into what it swore it would never do-settle. This note reflects on the monumental
changes in tobacco litigation over the past five years, including the proposed global
settlement, and explores possible future claims against the tobacco industry.
II. THE HISTORY OF TOBACCO LITIGATION
A. The First Wave
The first reports concerning the connection between smoking cigarettes and
cancer were published in 19502 For years the adverse health consequences of
smoking had been suspected, but these first reports offered the scientific proof
needed to substantiate these fears.4 In 1953, the most widely read magazine of the
day, Reader's Digest, published a condensed, readable version of these health
reports.5 Forthe first time, the average person could read and understand that smok-
ing could kill. Not surprisingly, the first damage claims arose against the tobacco
1. See, e.g., James W. Henges, Note, Cigarettes: Defectively Designed or Just Extremely
Dangerous?, 18 OKLA. CrTYU. L. REv. 559, 559 (1993); STANTON GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE
PAPERs xvii, 436-37 (1996).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Ernest L. Wynder & Evarts A. Graham, Tobacco Smoking as a Possible Etiologic
Factor in Bronchiogenic Carcinoma: A Study of Six Hundred and Eighty-Four Proved Cases, 143
JAMA 329, 329 (1950).
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industry about this same time. In 1954, what scholars term the "first wave" of
tobacco litigation began with the filing of Lowe v. R.J Reynolds Tobacco Co.6
Approximately 100 other cases followed quickly after Lowe, most of which were
based on claims of negligence and breach of warranty,7 and like Lowe, most were
subsequently dropped without formal disposition.'
Tobacco companies saw a definite threat in these tort claims, not only to their
profits but to their very existence.9 The industry committed to an absolute, no-com-
promise litigation strategy. They would offer to settle no case, and appeal every
adverse decision to the fullest extent." The effectiveness of the tobacco industry's
no-compromise strategy was to strangle plaintiffs' claims financially. Tobacco
lawyers would barrage plaintiffs attomeys with mountains of pretrial motions, from
interrogatories to depositions." The pretrial stages would drag on for years,
requiring the expenditure of enormous amounts of money before ajury was even
paneled.' This stonewalling of the industry's plan was critical. Because tobacco
manufacturers could absorb litigation costs better than plaintiffs, the industry
exploited this advantage. A single practitioner working on a contingency fee basis
would soon see his costs spiral far higher than any anticipated gain from a favorable
verdict. A substantial majority of the first wave cases were dropped or
discontinued. 3 Those cases that did reach trial eventually failed 4 or had to contend
with a number of appeals and retrials which also consumed funds.'5
The central defensive doctrine pled in the first wave by the tobacco industry
was foreseeability.' 6 The courts generally accepted this theory as inLartigue v. R.
6. No. 9673(C) (E.D. Mo. filed Mar. 10, 1954); see Rabin, supra note 4, at 857. Professor
Rabin defines the first wave as the cases filed between 1954 and the adoption of comment i of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. See id. at 857-64. The second wave is composed of those cases filed
after the proliferation of mass toxic tort cases in the 1970s and early 1980s (asbestos, Agent Orange,
and DES), up to the recent decision of Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992). See
Rabin, supra note 4, at 864-65. We are currently experiencing the third wave of tobacco litigation.
For a discussion of the third wave, see Richard A. Daynard, The Third Wave of Tobacco Products
Liability Cases, TRIAL, Nov. 1994, at 34.
7. See Rabin, supra note 4, at 857, 859.
8. Id. at 857.
9. Id. at 858.
10. Id. at 857-58.
11. Id. at 859.
12. See id. at 859-60.
13. See Rabin, supra note 4, at 859.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962), certifying questions
to Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963), enforced, Green v. American
Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, American Tobacco Co. v. Green, 377 U.S.
943 (1964), and cert. denied, Green v. American Tobacco Co., 377 U.S. 943 (1964). Green's
exhaustive thirteen-year litigation included four appeals to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and one
certification of question to the Florida Supreme Court.
16. Id. at 860-61.
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Reynolds Tobacco Co." The Louisiana court found that the plaintiff could not
recover from R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company for the damage caused by its
cigarettes.' 8 The court's reasoning illustrates the judicial thinking at that time.
Partially relying on the then-tentative draft of section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, the Fifth Circuit upheld a defense verdict on the grounds that the
evidence presented at trial supported the defendant's argument that the risks of
smoking were unforeseeable at the time the plaintiff developed cancer.'9 Without
some evidence that the seller knew that the product might cause harm, the seller was
not liable for breach of warranty." Because R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company did
not know of the dangers imposed by cigarettes, the court reasoned that the company
should not be held accountable.2'
After the Lartigue decision, the final draft of the Second Restatement of the
Law of Torts was adopted and published by the American Law Institute.' In
comment i to section 402A, Dean Prosser seemingly codified the rationale of the
Lartigue court concerning the liability of cigarettes.' A single sentence in that
comment, "[g]ood tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the
effects of smoking may be harmful; but tobacco containing something like
marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous," brought the first wave of tobacco
litigation to a screeching halt.24 In granting the tobacco industry what some
commentators have characterized as per se immunity,25 the courts, with the
knowledge requirement of section 402A, nullified any claims against the tobacco
industry under then-existing law. Almost twenty years passed before such claims
would arise once again from the ashes of defeat for the second wave of tobacco
litigation.
B. The Second Wave
In the lull between the first and second wave, a number of significant events
took place that would change the face of tobacco litigation. In 1964, the Surgeon
General published its report on the effects of smoking on health.26 With this report,
17. 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
18. Id. at 20.
19. Id. at 35-40.
20. See id. at 29 (construing the statutory bar to liability as limited by the "imputation of
knowledge to a seller-fabricator").
21. Id. at 39-40.
22. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
23. Id. § 402A crnt. i.
24. See Rabin, supra note 4, at 864.
25. See Alex J. Grant, New Theories of Cigarette Liability: The Restatement (Third) of Torts
and the Viability of a Design Defect Theory, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 343, 368 (1995).
26. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, PUB. No. 1103,
SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 26 (1964) [hereinafter the 1964 REPORT].
[Vol. 49:311
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the most prominent physician in the United States confirmed the health risks
involved with smoking. The connection between smoking and cancer was now
firmly implanted in the minds of Americans." In response to the 1964 Surgeon
General's report, Congress passed two important pieces of legislation concerning
cigarettes. The 1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act28 (1965 Act)
and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 196929 (1969 Act) required tobacco
manufacturers to place warning labels on cigarette packages and banned cigarette
advertising through radio and television. The tobacco industry actually favored
these acts to relieve pressure of potential liability for the harm caused by its
products."
The most significant development after the adoption of the Second Restatement
of Torts was the birth of mass toxic tort cases.3' The success of these new claims
owed significantly to strict products liability under section 402A. 2 By focusing on
the unreasonably dangerous nature of cigarettes, plaintiffs attorneys believed this
new theory against manufacturers could be used to attack the tobacco industry,
ironically under the same principle of law that had ended the first wave.33 Thus, the
second wave of tobacco litigation began.
Plaintiffs attorneys had to respond to the failures of the first wave. The most
notable obstacles were obtaining substantial resources, needed to survive the attrition
tactics of the tobacco industry and circumventing comment i of section 402A.34
First, a group of plaintiffs attorneys pooled resources to survive the onslaught of
tobacco companies' litigation tactics. Second, plaintiffs attorneys shifted their
claims from warranty to strict tort liability, thereby shifting the focus from
foreseeability of harm to the unreasonably dangerousness of the product itself.
36
In addition to these responses, two new theories appeared favorable to tobacco
claims. The first new theory was the emergence of a risk-utility analysis that
weighed the health-related costs, including the number of people dying each year
from cigarettes, against the individual's benefits derived from smoking.3 ' The
27. See Rabin, supra note 4, at 864.
28. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1982 & Supp. 1997)) [hereinafter 1965 Act].
29. Federal Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 133140 (1982 & Supp. 1997)) [hereinafter 1969 Act].
30. See GLANTZET AL., supra note 1, at 54.
31. Manufacturers of asbestos and other toxic products such as DES, Agent Orange, Dalkon
Shields, and Benedectin were overwhelmed with claims. See Rabin, supra note 4, at 865.
32. Id. at 866.
33. See id.
34. Id. at 865-66.
35. Id. at 866.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983) (utilizing risk analysis to
determine that a manufacturer of a luxury product may shoulder the cost of harm caused by the
product even if the product was equipped with a warning). The O'Brien court specified that risk-
utility analysis was appropriate "when the product may function satisfactorily under one set of
1998]
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second new theory relied upon the prominent use of comparative fault.38 If the
plaintiffs could win even a percentage of the damages sought, and they would not
be completely barred by assumption-of-risk defense, then the gravity of the damages
claimed would still ensure a profit for the attorneys.
Tobacco companies were also affected by the downfall of asbestos. When the
once-powerful manufacturing giants in the asbestos industry began petitioning for
bankruptcy reorganization under the weight of large potential liabilities, the tobacco
industry could closely analogize its situationto asbestos, which instilled anew level
of fear among the industry's manufacturers. 9 The tobacco industry felt that its
never-give-in strategy needed to be followed more stringently than ever. It also
developed some new tactics and defenses in response to the burgeoning new
theories of tort law, strategies which worked rather well.4"
Tobacco lawyers instituted a revamped attack on causation. They would use a
two-fold attack at trial, first attacking the plaintiff and his lifestyle, followed by a
challenge of the Surgeon General's findings.4 Tobacco lawyers would do an
extensive investigation into the plaintiff's background in an attempt to uncover any
information to cast him in an unfavorable light. They would stress anything in the
medical history which might show any other explanation for the illness.42 This
evidence was presented to deflect causation from the tobacco products, yet in many
instances, it functioned as a type of character assassination on the plaintiff. Past
behavior of heavy drinking, promiscuity, fighting, or other unsavory lifestyle
choices were often presented at trial in the name of causation." The tobacco
lawyers attacked the Surgeon General Reports on the grounds that the research done
to back up those reports was unscientific and incomplete." The industry would
present research conducted by its own, supposedly independent, research group, the
Tobacco Industry Research Committee, which later became the Council on Tobacco
Research, as a public relations tool and a means of challenging reports citing the
adverse health effects of smoking.45
In response to the new risk-utility analysis, the tobacco companies doggedly
stuck to comment i of section 402A. They argued that because a safer alternative
design or product had not been shown, a risk-utility analysis should not be used.
This argument was quite effective and met with success in a majority of courts.46
circumstances, yet because of its design present[s] undue risk of injury... in another situation." Id. at
304.
38. See Rabin, supra note 4, at 867.
39. See id. at 867-68.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 868.
42. Id.
43. See id.
44. GLANTZET AL., supra note 1, at 53.
45. See id. at 51-56.
46. See Paugh v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 834 F. Supp. 228, 230-31 (N.D. Ohio 1993);
Gianitsis v. American Brands, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 853, 855-59 (D.N.H. 1988); Halphen v. Johns-
[Vol. 49:311
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Under a consumer expectations test, plaintiffs cannot recover if they knew the
product was harmful to their health.47 However, in New Jersey and Louisiana,
legislation was passed to overturn decisions that required a safer alternative design
be shown before using risk-utility analysis.4" The tobacco industry lobbied for
"common knowledge" statutes which were passed in a number of states.49 These
statutes limited courts to using the consumer expectations test rather than risk-utility
analysis."
However, in all jurisdictions assumption of the risk has proven to be the most
effective defense for the tobacco industry. The general public knew that smoking
could cause disease. The tobacco companies used this general awareness to argue
that if a person chose to smoke knowing it could cause health problems, then
tobacco companies should not be liable when such problems arose.' Juries tended
to agree. In numerous cases, plaintiffs would survive the barrage ofpretrial motions
and tactics of the tobacco lawyers only to be denied recovery by juries because the
plaintiff chose to engage in conduct known to be harmful. 2 The tobacco industry
had complied with the federal mandate for warnings, and the plaintiff, having direct
knowledge of the dangers of his actions, chose to smoke anyway.
To combat the effectiveness of the tobacco industry's defenses, plaintiffs
lawyers developed two strategies to circumvent the assumption of risk defense.
Plaintiffs first argued that even though they had assumed some risk in choosing to
smoke, the tobacco companies were at least partially at fault under comparative
fault theory. If the jury agreed, the plaintiffs could recover, depending on the
jurisdiction's comparative fault system.53 In most cases, juries did not rule in favor
Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 115 (La. 1986) (allowing a jury instruction concerning the
balancing test of the risk-utility analysis). But see Rahmig v. Mosley Machinery Co., 412 N.W.2d 56,
70 (Neb. 1987) (leaving the adoption of the risk-utility theory to an appropriate case in the future).
47. See infra Part IV.B.2.
48. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2800.51-59 (West 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C (West
1987); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983).
49. See Rabin, supra note 4, at 874 n.126 and accompanying text (discussing such common
knowledge statutes in California, New Jersey, Louisiana, Arkansas, Indiana, Missouri, Ohio,
Tennessee, Utah, and Washington).
50. For example, California's statute, CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714.45(a)(2) (West Supp. 1997),
provides an exemption from a risk-utility analysis if "[t]he product is a common consumer product
intended for personal consumption, such as ... tobacco.. . as identified in comment i to Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts."
51. Rabin, supra note 4, at 871.
52. Id.
53. The various states use three basic types of fault systems. In a few states, the contributory
negligence standard bars a plaintiff from recovery if he is any way at fault for his injures. The
majority of states follow some form of comparative fault system. Under a pure comparative fault
system, the plaintiff may recover the percentage of damages for which the defendant was at fault, no
matter how small that percentage may be. Under a modified comparative fault system, the plaintiff is
denied recovery if his or her fault reaches a specified percentage, usually 50%. See DAVID G. OWEN
ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY 659-60 n.2 (3d ed. 1997). South Carolina uses a modified
comparative fault system which bars a plaintiff from recovery if the plaintiff's fault is greater than
1998]
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of the plaintiffs, holding the plaintiffs totally at fault for their own actions. 4 The
very few cases in which juries did find the tobacco companies at fault, the ratio of
fault was decidedly in the defendant's favor." For example, in Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc.,56 a New Jersey jury found the defendant twenty percent at fault.
However, under amodified comparative fault system, New Jersey law bars recovery
when a plaintiff is at least fifty percent at fault. As a result, the plaintiff was barred
from recovering altogether. 7
As a second strategy to bypass the assumption of risk defense, plaintiffs argued
addiction. If the plaintiff was truly addicted to the nicotine in cigarettes, then the
tobacco allowed no real freedom of choice. The tobacco lawyers vigorously
attacked this theory. The Surgeon General had classified nicotine as only habit-
uative and not addictive in the 1964 Report.58 Then, the 1988 Surgeon General's
report on nicotine addiction classified nicotine as an addictive drug. 9 The industry
attacked these findings in much the same way as it did the causation findings of
1964.60 Defense counsel would remind the jury that almost everyone knew some ex-
smokers, thereby showing that smokers could indeed quit if they wanted. As a
result, juries could easily ignore the addiction argument presented by the plaintiffs.
Even before the tobacco industry argued that plaintiffs assumed the risk,
tobacco industry attorneys used preemption as the most effective pretrial defense.
Tobacco lawyers argued that Congress had preempted all state common law damage
claims by enacting the 1965 and 1969 Acts. If the courts heard state damages
claims, then courts would be forcing tobacco companies to place additional
warnings on their products and in their advertisements, thereby circumventing the
intended purpose of Congress.6' This theory was rejected in some state courts,62 but
a number of federal judges agreed and dismissed the state law claims.63 As a result
of the disparity among the state and federal courts, the United States Supreme Court
that of the defendant. See Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243, 245, 399 S.E.2d 783, 784
(1991).
54. Rabin, supra note 4, at 870-7 1.
55. See, e.g., Horton v. American Tobacco Co., 667 So. 2d 1289, 1292-93 (Miss. 1995)
(finding the defendant to be at fault, but refusing to award any money damages, even under
Mississippi's pure comparative fault system which allows a plaintiff to recover if he is 99% at fault).
56. 693 F. Supp. 208 (D.N.J. 1988), affd, 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), rev'd, 505 U.S. 504
(1992).
57. Id. at 215.
58. See GLANTz ET AL., supra note 1, at 100 (citing 1964 REPORT, supra note 26).
59. See id at 58 (citing OFFICE ON SMOKING AND HEALTH, U.S. DEP'TOF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL. 88-
8406 (1988)).
60. See Rabin, supra note 4, at 859.
61. See Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 233-35 (6th Cir. 1988); Palmer
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 625-26 (1st Cir. 1987).
62. See Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Minn. 1989); Dewey v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1247-51 (N.J. 1990).
63. See Roysdon, 849 F.2d at 233-35; Palmer, 25 F.2d at 625-26.
[Vol. 49:311
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intervened to lay down a uniform standard concerning preemption in Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc.'
Cipollone signaled the end of the second wave of tobacco litigation and set the
parameters for the next wave. 5 Plaintiffs failed, as they did in the first wave, to
register a single victory. The few minor breakthroughs in which the tobacco
companies had been found at fault had been nullified either through comparative
fault, including assumption of risk, or appeal.6 The central defense strategies-the
moral high ground, assumption of risk, and preemption-appeared to create an
impenetrable barrier for personal injury claims. In 1992, the tobacco industry
seemingly had successfully survived the same fate as asbestos and other toxic
products.
C. The Third Wave
Cipollone established a conceptualized framework for future claims against the
tobacco industry. Rose and Antonio Cipollone brought the original complaint. A
smoker since the age of 13, Rose developed terminal luhg cancer. Although the jury
found the tobacco company twenty percent at fault under the breach of warranty and
failure to warn claims, Rose Cipollone's claims were barred altogether because her
fault exceeded that of the defendant's. 7 The jury awarded Antonio $400,000 in
damages; however, the Third Circuit reversed this decision and held that all of the
common law damage claims were preempted. 8
The Court granted certiorari to settle the issue of federal preemption of state
damage claims in a decision that epitomized judicial interpretation and disagree-
ment. Only four parts of the six-part decision garnered a majority vote of the Court,
and the first three sections were discussions of the uncontested history of the law
and facts of the case. Although a definitive precedent with respect to the 1965 Act
existed, the Court was split on the preemption implications of the 1969 Act. The
following discussion is an attempt to break the decision down into a framework for
future litigation.
In the only substantive statement garnering a majority, Part IV of Justice
Stevens's opinion held that the 1965 Act did not preempt any state common law
damage claims. The 1965 Act preempted only specific state-imposed legislative
requirements on the labeling or promotion of cigarettes.6 9 The Court found that
Congress intended the 1965 Act to avoid a myriad of requirements imposed by
64. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
65. See Rabin, supra note 4, at 874.
66. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 581-82 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding
that the plaintiff's intentional tort claims were preempted by federal law).
67. Rabin, supra note 4, at 871.
68. Cipollone, 893 F.2d at 581-82.
69. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518-20.
1998]
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individual states which would create an undue burden on the tobacco industry. 70
Therefore, state common law damage claims were not affected or preempted.7'
In Part V, the Stevens plurality found the fundamental difference between the
1965 Act and the 1969 Act in only a few words. The 1969 Act prohibited any
"'requirement[s] or prohibition[s],"' where the 1965 Act prohibited just statements,
and "'advertising or promotion,"' ratherthanjust normal typeface advertising.72 The
opinion reasoned that this language significantly broadened the scope of Congress's
intended preemptive effect. The language was not narrowly tailored to preempt only
positive enactments by state legislatures but also preempted any practice under state
law which may affect advertising and promotion.73 This broad construction included
state common law damage claims. However, Justice Stevens did not believe that all
common-law claims were preempted. His opinion stated that a court, in determining
which claims are preempted, must conduct an analysis "in light of a strong
presumption against pre-emption" as to whether the claim, under state law, would
impose a requirement or prohibition with respect to either advertising or promotion
of cigarettes.74 If so, the claim was preempted.
The Stevens plurality determined that the failure to warn claims are preempted
"to the extent that they rely on a state-law 'requirement or prohibition... with
respect to ... advertising and promotion.' 75 Such claims affect what cigarette
companies are required to place on their labels or ads. Similarly, claims based on
state common law which challenge the tobacco industry's compliance with the 1969
Act are preempted. These claims are collateral to failure-to-warn claims and
"'inevitably bring[] into question [the tobacco companies'] advertising and
promotional activities."' 76 Claims that are not preempted are those based "solely"
on tobacco companies' research or testing of products. 7 However, the opinion
stated that claims of misrepresentation and conspiracy to defraud based on
concealment of material fact are in no way preempted." Such claims are not based
on a duty to comply but rather on a "duty not to deceive." '79 The tobacco industry
cannot hide behind the 1969 Act and deceive the public as to its knowledge of the
dangers of cigarettes. Finally, the Court stated that breach of express warranty
claims are not preempted because such claims are based on contractual duties, even
where the terms of the warranty are in an advertisement."
70. Id. at 519.
71. Id. at 520.
72. Id. at 520 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1331-40) (alteration in original).
73. Id. at 521-23.
74. Id. at 523.
75. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1331-40).
76. Id. at 525 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664, 675 (D.N.J. 1986)).
77. Id. at 524-25.
78. See id. at 527-3 0.
79. Id. at 528-29.
80. See id. at 525-27.
[Vol. 49:311
10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss2/8
THE FUTURE OF TOBACCO LITIGATION
As a whole, Cipollone provides plaintiffs with a good indication of the types
of claims that will be viable in the future. The Court has maintained the availability
of intentional tort claims, such as fraud and conspiracy, and express warranty
claims. Preemption denies only claims that directly affect the promotion or
advertising of cigarettes." Though one may argue that failure to warn claims have
been, for practical purposes, preempted outright, such claims may remain viable.
While a majority sustained the judgment that the Cipollones' failure to warn and
misrepresentation claims were preempted, the case has uncertain precedential value
because amajority did not support the rationale of Stevens's opinion. Nevertheless,
the language of the opinion suggests that the presiding court should analyze a future
claim to determine if the claim falls within the detined category of preempted laws.
Therefore, the Court did not preempt categorically any of the claims; rather, it
provided a guideline or test for the lower courts to use in the future. Two of the
participating Justices, White and Blackmun, have since left the Court, making the
precedential value of the Stevens's opinion even weaker. Although the two newest
members of the Court, Ginsberg and Breyer, will not likely agree with Scalia and
Thomas, the strict constructionists, one can only speculate whether either will
choose the Blacknun rationale, the Stevens philosophy, or another line of reasoning
on the preemptive nature of the 1969 Act.
Taking this uncertainty into account, plaintiffs lawyers in the third wave can
construct their claims to circumvent the preemption question. Claims based on
misrepresentations of material fact and conspiracy to defraud are immune to
preemption under Cipollone, as is a claim for breach of express warranty. With
respect to failure to warn claims, careful pleading should defeat a preemption
defense. The plaintiff must base the claim on the tobacco companies' failure to
release information derived from their own research or testing. If the claim is
pleaded in terms of information from the general public, then a court may interpret
the claim to be within the scope of preemption. A much better claim would be
failure to release research results to legislatively defined administrative agencies
under state consumer protection laws. 2 From the language of the Stevens opinion,
such claims would not fall within the scope of preemption under the 1969 Act. 3
The tobacco companies have played both sides of the fence by first arguing
against causation, and then relying on assumption of risk by arguing that the
plaintiff knew that smoking would cause serious health problems. Justice Stevens
found the misrepresentation claims based on the tobacco companies' negation of
consumer warnings within the preemptive scope of the 1969 Act. 4 Some analysts
have found this rationale confusing and contradictory." However, a careful read
81. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
82. See Heather Valide Kehoe, Note, Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc.-Narrowing the Scope of
Federal Pre-emption: Tobacco Torts Become Winnable, 38 Loy. L. REv. 1191, 1203 (1993).
83. See id.
84. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 527-28.
85. See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Product Liability-Cigarettes and Cipollone: What's Left
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ing of the opinion may present another vehicle by which to bring such claims. The
Court recognized that prior FTC and FDA regulations "express[ed] a similar
understanding of the relationship between required warnings and advertising that
'negates or disclaims' those warnings."8 The Court may allow similar claims if the
claims are brought under those regulations rather than state common law claims.
In summary, Cipollone was a victory for future plaintiffs because it left most
of the state common-law claims unaffected by the preemption defense. More
importantly, the split in the Court left open the possibility that all such claims may
ultimately succeed. Careful pleading and new evidence showing the tobacco
industry's knowledge of the harmful and addictive nature of its product may finally
provide the means for private plaintiffs to break through the virtual immunity the
industry has enjoyed for over forty years.
III. THE BEGINNING OF THE END: THE MONUMENTAL CHANGES OF THE THIRD
WAVE
A. The Cigarette Papers
On May 12, 1994, a box containing several thousand pages of documents
arrived on the desk of Professor Stanton Glantz at the University of California, San
Francisco." The documents were from Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corpora-
tion (B&W) and detailed over thirty years of fraud and deceit by not only B&W but
also the entire tobacco industry. The documents revealed that the industry has
known conclusively since the sixties that tobacco use directly correlated with cancer
and that the central ingredient in cigarettes, nicotine, was an addictive drug.88 The
documents also revealed that the tobacco industry commonly manipulated nicotine
levels and used toxic additives in cigarettes. 9
B&W hired the law firm of Wyatt, Tarrant, & Combs in Louisville, Kentucky,
to* sort and analyze roughly 8.5 million pages of company documents. Merrell
Williams was a paralegal assigned to the project who systematically copied
documents which he deemed the most important-about 10,000 pages-and
eventually posted the documents to Professor Glantz with the return address of"Mr.
Butts."9 The knowledge of the documents quickly spread throughout the media and
eventually sparked the interest of some members of Congress. 9' In response, B&W
What's Gone?, 53 LA. L. Ray. 713, 735-37 (1993).
86. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 527-28 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 191.102 (1965)).
87. See GLANrZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 6. Presumably, Professor Glantz received these
documents in part due to his involvement in the non-smokers' rights movement. See id. at 495.
Professor Glantz has made available all the documents he received from Merrell Williams at the
following Internet address: http://www.library.uscf.edu/tobacco.
88. See id. at 32.
89. See id. at 83, 211.
90. See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 6-7.
91. See id. at 8. B&W issued subpoenas to the Congressmen Henry Waxman (D-CA) and Ron
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claimed the documents were stolen.' The company tried frantically to retrieve the
documents, but the courts denied all requests of protection from disclosure by
B&W.93
1. The Tobacco Industry Research Committee
The tobacco industry created the Tobacco Industry Research Committee
(TIRC) in 1954 for the publicly stated purpose of determining the nature of the
health risks caused by smoking.94 However, the private documents of B&W show
that TIRC served as a public relations ploy to allow the industry to: (1) aggressively
attack reports concerning the negative health effects of cigarettes," (2) to reinforce
the appearance of a controversy over the findings,96 and (3) to protect against
liability for cigarettes.9 In fact, public relations firms were hired by tobacco
companies to use the information presented by TIRC in advertising campaigns and
attacks against the Surgeon General reports.98
In addition to the involvement of public relations firms, industry lawyers had
a significant amount of control over what research TIRC conducted and what was
released to the public." First, lawyers could control efforts to limit the possible
liability which could arise from the findings of TIRC. Attorneys would quash or
destroy immediately any evidence produced by TIRC that could be used as a
"smoking gun."'00 Second, the infusion of lawyers into the research and testing
aspect of the tobacco industry provided a means to avoid discovery in future suits
filed against the industry. With lawyers involved in every aspect of the research
process, the industry was able to claim attorney-client and work product privileges
Wyden (D-OR) in order to obtain copies of the documents. These subpoenas were eventually quashed
in Maddox v. Williams, 855 F. Supp. 406,413-15 (D.D.C. 1994).
92. See id. at 10.
93. See id. at 8-10.
94. See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 44. In 1964, the TIRC was renamed the Council for
Tobacco Research - U.S.A. (CTR). Id. at 32.
95. Id. at 44, 53.
96. Id. at 40.
97. See id. at 40, 44.
98. See id. at 40. TIRC conducted "health oriented" research to find the actual health effects of
cigarettes and any possible ways to reduce harm. In contrast, TIRC's "health image" research created
a false sense of security among the general public concerning the connection between cigarettes and
cancer, which the tobacco industry knew to be unassailable on scientific grounds. See id. at 26, 114.
99. See generally GLAMz ET AL., supra note 1, chs. 5, 8, & 9 (containing a substantial amount
of discussion concerning lawyer involvement in every aspect of the tobacco industry's treatment of
research results.
100. See id. at 230, 246, 321-22.
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to keep the most damaging findings out of the hands of plaintiffs throughout the
first and second wave of litigation. 1'01
Attorney control had substantial effects in areas other than discovery. Industry
lawyers routinely suppressed studies proposed by research scientists that attorneys
thought might lead to damaging revelations exposing the industry to liability. 2
Even more incredibly, lawyers often had the final say over what results would be
published and, in some instances, edited the reports to lessen the detrimental effect
they had in terms of liability.'03 These examples show that the industry was far more
concerned with protecting themselves than they were with encouraging any
legitimate public discussion on the health effects of cigarettes.
2. What the Industry Knew
a. Cancer and Compensation
The tobacco industry has contested the causal link between smoking and cancer
since the first reports arose in the early fifties. But the documents from B&W show
that the industry has known that a connection exists since shortly after those first
reports were made public.' TIRC reports and research conducted by British
American Tobacco'0 5 informed B&W that smoking did in fact cause cancer.' 6
Thus, the tobacco industry has publicly promoted a controversy over this connection
for decades, while its own researchers have told them that no such controversy
exists.
In response to the 1964 Surgeon General's report which established the causal
link between smoking and cancer, the tobacco industry began to market low tar
cigarettes for the "health conscious" smoker.'"7 Yet, the tobacco industry knew that
smoker compensation falsified the reduction in health risks implied by these
products.'0" The Surgeon General recognized the possible negative effects due to
compensation in some of the later reports,'" but the tobacco industry has made no
public statement concerning its own research results which confirm these fears.
101. See id. at 235-47; see also Ronald L. Motley & Tucker S. Player, Issues in "Crime-
Fraud" Practice and Procedure: The Tobacco Litigation Experience, 49 S.C. L. REV. 187 (1998)
(discussing the application of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client relationship in tobacco
litigation).
102. See id. at 243-47.
103. Id. at 346-52, 377-85 tbl.9.1.
104. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
105. British American Tobacco is the parent company of B&W.
106. GLANTZETAL., supra note 1, at 139.
107. Id. at 26-28.
108. See id. at 27. Compensation is the practice of smokers to inhale more deeply and smoke
more when smoking low tar cigarettes. The primary purpose of smoking is to obtain a certain level of
nicotine. To obtain such a level through low tar cigarettes requires the smoker to inhale more of the
smoke, thereby destroying any health benefit of the cigarette.
109. Id. at 87.
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b. Addiction
The tobacco industry's most vehement denials in the past concerned the
addictive qualities of nicotine. To this day, the industry refuses to publicly
recognize smoking as addictive rather than a mere habit easily broken."' However,
the B&W documents show that as early as 1963, the company received research
results classifying nicotine as an addictive substance."' Addison Yeaman, vice
president and general counsel for B&W, stated in a 1963 memo circulated to the
managing partners of B&W that they were "in the business of selling nicotine, an
addictive drug" and that future decisions should be based on that fact.' 2 Not until
the 1988 Surgeon General's report on smoking and health was nicotine publicly
classified as an addictive substance under the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV
of the American Psychiatric Association. "In sum, the tobacco industry has known
since 1963 that tobacco is addictive.
The B&W documents show more than just knowledge on the part of the
industry and, at the very least, show that B&W made decisions with addiction in
mind."4 B&W conducted numerous studies on levels of nicotine, some of which
concerned what levels were consumed by the average smoker". and others which
sought methods of manipulating such levels in their cigarettes." 6 In the develop-
ment of low tar cigarettes, the industry worried that reduced levels of nicotine might
provide a mode through which smokers could more easily abandon the habit, thus
prompting enhanced levels of nicotine in low tar cigarettes."' Because the industry
viewed cigarettes as "nicotine delivery systems," the companies designed cigarettes
to be efficient delivery mechanisms.' "8 Finally, because the industry recognized that
increased tolerance levels were a key to the survival of cigarettes, the tobacco
companies studied the effects of tobacco and the smoker's development of
immunity to its effects." 9
Surprisingly, the research revealed certain benefits derived from nicotine in
terms of its positive effects on the body. Findings showed that nicotine is primarily
110. See id. at 100. Though the tobacoo industry has preliminarily agreed to admit in the Global
Settlement that nicotine is addictive, the admissions are not official and public until and unless
Congress approves the Global Settlement. See infra notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
111. GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 15-17.
112. Id. at 15.
113. See id. at 58.
114. See generally id. at 58-107 (noting that the B&W documents show a continuous and
systematic practice over the last 35 years on the part of the industry to protect this information from
public disclosure and to manufacture and market cigarettes as nicotine delivery devices).
115. See id, at 95-96.
116. GLANTzFTAL., supra note 1, at 124.
117. See id. at 102.
118. Seeid. at 58-60.
119. See id. at 63. Tolerance is the process where the body develops an immunity to the effect
of a drug and accordingly needs more of the drug to achieve the same effect. Tolerance is a key factor
in the determination of whether a drug is categorized as addictive in the medical profession. See id.
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a stress reducer and can be a factor in weight control.'2 In terms of weight control,
tolerance was a significant factor. When a person begins to smoke, a decrease in
appetite and a subsequent weight loss occurs. Eating habits then return to normal
when the body develops a tolerance to the nicotine. When a smoker quits, the
suppressant qualities of the nicotine are no longer present, and a corresponding
weight gain normally occurs.'
c. Second-hand Smoke
In 1986, the Surgeon General reported that second-hand smoke could cause
disease in non-smokers.'" The tobacco industry had reached similar findings with
their own research."z However, lawyers in control of the research projects began
a policy of protection in the late seventies which discouraged conducting any
projects-that might show any harmful effects of cigarettes.'24 Thus, projects focusing
on the possible carcinogenicity of "sidestream" smoke were stifled and replaced
with new directives.'" The purpose of the new projects was two-fold. First,
researchers would try to reduce the amount of sidestream smoke. Second, research
would refute any findings on second-hand smoke.'26 These documents illustrate that
the industry ignored, and possibly knew but concealed, the damage to non-smokers
to protect itself from liability and the likelihood of public relations problems.
3. A Safer Cigarette
When the first reports about the health risks of smoking surfaced in the fifties,
the tobacco industry launched a research campaign through private research
facilities funded by the individual manufacturers to find the toxic substances in
cigarettes and remove them. 27 Enormous effort went into finding a safer cigarette,
but the industry eventually abandoned the campaign after it was deemed too
difficult and too costly.'28 Although manufacturers labeled these campaigns
hopeless, the reasons for their conclusion could be characterized as improper. Two
safety enhancements to cigarettes appeared promising-ariel and chemosol. Both
approaches were eventually discarded for reasons based more on fear of liability
and governmental regulation than on legitimate safety reasons.
120. Id. at 61-62.
121. See id. at 69.
122. See GLANTZETAL., supra note 1, at 22.
123. See id. at 394-410.
124. See id. at 316-27.
125. See generally id. at 394-434 (discussing various research studies concerning sidestream
smoke).
126. See id. at 412-16 (discussing the Hirayama matter as an example).
127. See id. at 108-69.
128. See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 74-77.
[Vol. 49:311
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss2/8
THE FUTURE OF TOBACCO LITIGATION
a. Ariel
In the late sixties and early seventies, tobacco researchers studied a filter design
named Ariel.'29 British American Tobacco, B&W's parent corporation, 30 invented
the initial design which controlled the concentrations of nicotine by means of the
filter. While the Ariel filter would block the tar from a cigarette much like the low
tar designs already on the market, it would also allow nicotine through the filter.
The nicotine would then separate itself from the rest of the smoke, forming in a
concentrated liquid in the smoker's mouth. Thus, the smoker would obtain the
nicotine he sought without inhaling the smoke into his lungs.'
This process benefited smokers in two significant ways. First, it removed the
need for a smoker to inhale any smoke into his lungs to obtain the nicotine fix he
craved, greatly reducing the damage caused by tar and other substances in cigarette
smoke which were not involved in the transmission ofnicotine. 32 Second, for those
smokers who would still inhale, it destroyed the compensation phenomenon because
the smoker would receive the nicotine he craved in his mouth rather than in his
lungs.33 Therefore, the craving to smoke more often or to inhale more deeply would
effectively be eliminated.
Although manufacturers initially embraced the Ariel design with optimism, this
attitude was short-lived. Lawyers were quick to point out that publicizing the
tobacco industry's manipulation of nicotine would surely invite federal regulation
of cigarettes.'34 The Ariel project never came to market for fear of admitting that
other cigarette brands were, in fact harmful to a smoker's health. 3 '
b. Chemosol
In 1966, Dr. Perry Hudson, a scientist affiliated with Columbia University,
experimented with a newly developed chemical called Chemosol. 36 Researchers
claimed that Chemosol greatly reduced the risk of cancer in smoking by facilitating
increased combustion before inhalation, greatly reducing the level of carcinogens
in cigarette smoke.'37 This reduction in carcinogen intake produced, in turn, a
significant reduction in cancer formation in his experimental subjects.'38 Skeptical
of the cancer reduction claims considering its own failure to find a safer cigarette,3 9
129. See id.
130. See id. at 74-76.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 76.
133. See id.; supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
134. See GLANTZETAL., supra note 1, at 80.
135. Id. at 77.
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the industry planned an independent research project through Hazelton Laborato-
ries, a private research facility in Virginia. 40
Dr. Hudson's testimony concerning Chemosol before the House ofRepresenta-
fives in 1969 pressured the industry to follow through with the planned independent
research.' 4' Industry representatives publicly agreed to proceed with the Hazelton
test;142 however, it appears this testing never happened.
From the outset, the possibility of truly independent research was minimal. The
tobacco companies acted together because they felt the research would impact the
entire industry. 43 To protect the industry from the kinds of possible liability which
might arise from such research, the companies allowed lawyers to dictate the
manner in which the research would be conducted. 4 4 This decision was the
proverbial straw that broke the camel's back.
The Hazelton representatives proposed a test centered on the reduction of
benzo(a)pyrene levels, considered the most carcinogenic toxin in cigarettes. 45 The
cigarette lawyers objected to this testing approach,'46 but no specific evidence
within the documents suggests why such a stringent objection existed. The lawyers
may have feared that if the tests showed a reduction in benzo(a)pyrene but not a
reduction in carcinogenity, then the tests would show that other cancer-causing
toxins existed in cigarettes. 47 This proof could be an admission on causation, which
the industry still contested at trial. The tobacco lawyers would not approve the
testing protocol, and this stubbomess, for whatever reason, likely stopped the tests
on Chemosol. Neither the documents cataloged in The Cigarette Papers nor
documents in the public domain contain evidence that the Hazelton research on
Chemosol ever tookplace."' The Chemosol incident is revealing: The true concern
andmotive oftobacco companies has been with liability andpublic relations rather
than with the health ofAmerican smokers.
4. Additives
The documents from B&W show that the use of various additives in cigarettes
had been commonplace since the introduction of cigarettes to the market.'49 They
also illustrate that the tobacco industry knew that certain additives increased the
health risk of cigarettes, but continued to use them anyway.' 0 Some of the
140. See GLANTZ ETAL., supra note 1, at 214.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 215.
143. See id. at 213, 216.
144. See id. at 214-15.
145. See id.
146. See GLANTZETAL., supra note 1, at 214-15.
147. See id. at 214-15.
148. Id. at 216.
149. See id. at 218-25.
150. See id. at 219-23.
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revelations in the documents concerning additives are truly astonishing.
The tobacco industry is agriculturally similar to other farming industries that
produce food for American consumption. This similarity includes the use of
herbicides and pesticides by both types of industries.' However, the consumption
of cigarettes is different from food, and the risks posed by each chemical when
placed on a plant is different. The tobacco industry's own researchers stressed that
the nature of some chemicals inhaled after combustion (pyrolysis) may be toxic
even though the chemicals would be safe to ingest.'52 In recent years, however, the
industry has ignored these results.'
The instances in which the industry knew the additives were toxic demonstrate
little concern for safety. Farmers continued using Penar & MH-30, chemicals that
increase crop yield, years after researchers found those additives highly toxic. 4
Because the federal government did not require the industry to release any
information concerning the additives used in cigarettes, the industry had little
interest in publishing the health hazards from these additives. Manufacturers used
additives such as Freon 5 - and antifreeze,5 6 and some are still used today. In 1994,
due in large part to heavy pressure from health groups, the tobacco industry
published a non-exhaustive list of common additives used in the processing of
cigarettes." 7
The Cigarette Papers is the most startling and disturbing evidence ever released
to the public concerning the nefarious intent and actions of the tobacco industry. For
the first time, the iron curtain of secrecy was pulled back, if only a tiny bit, and the
truth was able to seep through. The impact was immediate, but the magnitude of
that impact has yet to be realized fully.
B. The Liggett Settlement
On March 20, 1997, the tobacco industry received the most devastating blow
to date when one of its own broke ranks and agreed to settle with the states'
Attorneys General. 58 Throughout the years of virtual tort and regulatory immunity,
the industry worked together, not only to protect themselves at trial, but to mislead
and defraud the public. The Cigarette Papers created a significant crack in the
industry's seamless wall of secrecy and immunity, but the Liggett Settlement threat-
ened to bring the wall crashing down.
151. See GLANTZETAL., supra note 1, at 203-11.
152. See id. at 210.
153. Id. at211.
154. Id. at 203-05.
155. Id. at 216-17.
156. GLANTZErAL., supra note 1, at 223-25.
157. Id. at 231. The use of more dubious additives evidenced in the Cigarette Papers were not
included in this list. The industry possibly stopped using the most toxic substances at some point out
of fear of future liability for using certain additives.
158. Liggett Settlement (visited Jan. 24, 1998) <http://STIC.neu.edu/index2.html>.
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The Liggett Group is one of the smallest tobacco companies in the United
States. In 1996, a failed attempt at taking over R.J. Reynolds severely weakened its
financial stability." 9 This weakened condition, coupled with the enormous cost of
the Cipollone litigation, forced Liggettto the brink of bankruptcy. To protect itself,
Liggett struck a deal with the states' Attorneys General and ended the conspiracy
of silence and fraud which had endured for over fifty years."
The deal between Liggett and the Attorneys General provided protection for
Liggett in -exchange for establishing a fund to reimburse the states and for
cooperating in the suits against all other non-settling tobacco companies.'" The
settlement fund would consist of an initial payment of $25 million and payment of
twenty-five percent of Liggett's yearly pretax income at the end of the fiscal year
for the next twenty-five years.'62
The most important aspect of the Liggett Settlement was the agreement to help
in the cases filed against the non-settling tobacco companies. Liggett agreed to turn
over all documents in its possession which may have led to admissible evidence in
the actions against the non-settling tobacco companies.6" Liggett also agreed to aid
in discovery proceedings, to direct the Attorneys General to possible witnesses, and
to waive all claims of privilege to documents and testimony provided by Liggett in
the pending actions.' In short, Liggett agreed to switch sides and work with the
Attorneys General to prevail in their suits against the non-settling tobacco
companies.
The backlash from other tobacco companies was immediate. The non-settling
tobacco companies filed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) on the day the
settlement was announced. The TRO restricted the delivery of any documents to the
Attorneys General that might have contained information to which the tobacco
companies had joint privilege claims. The TRO specifically cited documents
pertaining to the Committee of Counsel, an almost secret group of tobacco lawyers
who were responsible for the litigation strategy of the industry. Though the TRO
seemed to restrict only the dissemination of documents to which the companies had
a valid claim of privilege, the non-settling tobacco companies used it to tie up all
of the Liggett documents in in camera hearings to determine claims of privilege.,"
Though the TRO delayed the disclosure of the Liggett documents, the tactics
did not prevent it. A judge in Florida ordered the industry to turn over the requested
documents'" after the Attorney General defeated the industry's claim of privilege
159. Joseph Menn & Carrick Mollenkamp, Global Tobacco Pact Could Break Liggett, THE
NEWS AND OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 27, 1997, at A5.
160. ld.
161. Liggett Settlement, supra note 158, § 4.1(1), (5).
162. Id. § 6; See Menn & Mollenkamp, supra note 159, at A5.
163. Liggett Settlement, supra note 158, § 4.3.1.
164. Id.
165. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. 97-CVS-2173 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Mar.
20, 1997).
166. Florida v. American Tobacco Co., CL 95-1466 AH (Fla. Cir. Ct. Apr. 1, 1997).
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by relying on the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client and work-product
privileges. Even the limited information available to the public about the Liggett
documents holds damaging repercussions for the tobacco industry. While the
documents detailed in The Cigarette Papers are mainly restricted to B&W,
preliminary glimpses into the Liggett documents show that they will implicate the
entire industry. 67 Some documents, available to the public yet exclusive to
Liggett, 168 show conclusively that, at the very least, Liggett intentionally manipu-
lated nicotine levels in cigarettes and directly targeted underage smokers in its
advertising campaigns. 69 Such documents, if applicable to the entire industry,
would constitute the smoking guns for which attorneys have been searching.
IV. FUTURE CLAIMS AND CAUSES OF ACTION
The ramifications of Cipollone, the B&W documents from The Cigarette
Papers, and the Liggett documents should open the door to a number of causes of
action which have failed in the past. For the first time in the history of tobacco
litigation, plaintiffs have several viable causes of action which have a good chance
of succeeding at trial. The recent developments previously discussed have already
had an impact in a Florida case in which the court awarded a plaintiff $750,000 in
damages against the tobacco industry.'70
A. Evidentiary Issues
Considering the extremely damaging potential the Cigarette Papers and the
Liggett documents may have in court, the primary question for a lawyer is whether
they will be admissible. At the moment, the outlook is quite favorable. Despite
B&W's frantic attempt to retrieve the Cigarette Papers and to quash any public
display, they have yet to obtain a legal victory.' The courts have consistently held
that the attorney-client and work product privileges are no longer viable because the
documents are within the public domain.172 The policy behind the privileges is to
keep the information from one's opponent or from the public-at-large. With such
widespread availability of the papers, the privileges offer no such protection. The
horse having already escaped the barn, a court has little reason to order the door to
be shut. Thus, the attorney-client and work product privileges are no longer
available to shelter the Cigarette Papers and the Liggett documents from admission
167. See id.
168. Liggett Documents (visited Jan. 24, 1998) <http://STIC.neu.edu/index2.html>.
169. See id. (Memorandum from K.E. Cohn, Development of Cigarette with Increased Smoke
PH (Sept. 7, 1977)).
170. Suein Hwang et al., Smoke Signal: Jury's Tobacco Verdict Suggests Tough Times Ahead
for the Industry, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 1996, at Al.
171. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
172. See Maddox v. Williams, 855 F. Supp. 406 (D.D.C. 1994).
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into evidence.'73
A plaintiff can overcome the attorney-client and work product privileges by
showing that they do not apply to the documents in question or that the documents
show a perpetuation of fraud or deceit by the attorney and client.'74 If the evidence
shows ongoing or future fraud, the documents are not protected.' Presumably, if
the documents show proof of prior fraud only, then they are protected. Numerous
rulings throughout the United States have found that industry documents are
unprotected by privilege claims.'
76
B. Strict Products Liability and Negligence
1. Risk-Utility and the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
The proposed final draft of the new Products Liability Restatement employs
risk-utility analysis as the method for determining design defectiveness, but it
expressly bases liability on the availability of a reasonable alternative design.'" The
Restatement specifically rejects the global balancing of risks against benefits
undertaken in O'Brien.7 ' The Products Liability Restatement includes partial
immunity for generically dangerous products, such as alcohol and firearms, though
in a different form than that granted by comment i of section 402A of the Second
Restatement.' 79 The Products Liability Restatement contemplates that a plaintiff
173. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text. Privileges will present obstacles in claims
against companies other than Liggett and B&W; yet, considering the information contained within the
documents, plaintiffs lawyers should be able to overcome both privileges.
174. See generally Motley & Player, supra note 101, at 206-07 (discussing the means by which
a plaintiff can overcome the defendant's assertions that the defendant's statements, actions, and
documents are protected by the attorney-client privilege).
175. See id. at 194. See generally Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992)
(discussing the parameters of the attorney-client privilege).
176. See Sackman v. Liggett Group Inc., 920 F. Supp. 357 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); see also Burton v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 167 F.R.D. 134 (D. Kan. 1996) (establishing prima facie case of fraud
warranted in camera review of requested documents to determine if attorney-client privilege applied);
Kueper v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Civ. Act. No.91-L-734 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1992); Florida v.
American Tobacco Co., CL-95-1466 AH (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 1997); Butler v. Philip Morris, (Miss.
Civ. Action No. 94-5-53).
177. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (Proposed Final Draft
1997) [hereinafter PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT).
178. See O'Brien v. Muskin, 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983). Commentators have widely criticized
the O'Brien decision for its expansive view of the risk-utility analysis. The O'Brien analysis has been
characterized as a global balancing test, a test that was previously rejected by the ALL. For an in-
depth analysis of the proper risk-utility balancing test, see David G. Owen, Toward a Proper Test for
Design Defectiveness: "Micro-Balancing" Costs and Benefits, 75 TEx. L. 1Ev. 1661 (1997).
179. PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 177, § 2(b) cmt. d.
The requirement in Subsection (b) that plaintiff show a reasonable alternative design
applies in most instances even though the plaintiff alleges that the category of product sold
by the defendant is so dangerous that it should not have been marketed at all .... Common
and widely distributed products such as alcoholic beverages, tobacco, firearms, and above-
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must establish that the costs of adopting the proposed alternative design are less
than the resulting benefits of the altered design.'80 Under such an approach,
products liability claims against tobacco manufacturers should fare quite well.
Comment d of the Products Liability Restatement... retains the immunity from
O'Brien's true global balancing test, initially provided by comment i of the Second
Restatement.' Yet, new information concerning nicotine, additives, and alternate
filter designs discussed above should provide ample ammunition for showing that
a safer alternative design has existed for years. Though none of these alternative
designs would make cigarettes safe, the alternative designs certainly indicate that
manufacturers could have lessened the detrimental health effects, thus making
cigarettes safer.
The tobacco industry may rely on the reduction of benefits in defending against
safer alternative design claims. This defense is weak at best. The benefits derived
from smoking are minimal. Arguments based on smoking satisfaction may be
superficially valid in the case of Chemosol, Ariel, or other filter designs,183 but such
arguments are not available with respect to claims based on the additives. The taste
derived from a harmful pesticide or toxic chemical is not critical to the flavor of a
cigarette. The industry may argue that nicotine provides the major satisfaction
benefit of smoking and that a reduction of nicotine would destroy the very purpose
of smoking. While superficially true, this argument overlooks the addictive nature
of nicotine which converts the satisfaction of an addictive craving from a benefit to
a detriment. Surely a court would not permit a heroin supplier sued by an addict to
defend the reasonableness of supplying such an addictive drug on the grounds that
it "benefitted" the addict by satisfying his cravings for the drug.
Nicotine itself is a strong carcinogen. The evidence of industry engineering of
nicotine levels provides a strong basis for a design defect claim. By increasing the
levels of this carcinogenic substance in its product, the industry increased the risk
of harm in its products without a corresponding increase in benefits. The require-
ments of a reasonably safer alternative design appear fully satisfied under this form
of claim. Considering the new evidence of industry's knowledge of nicotine's
ground swimming pools may be found to be defective only upon proof of the requisite
conditions in Subsection (a), (b), or (c).
Id. cmt. c. On May 20, 1997, the ALI voted to strike the word "tobacco" from the above-quoted
language. See DAVID G. OWEN & MARY J. DAVIS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY 107, n.I (3d ed.
Supp. 1997). It remains to be seen whether this move will have any effect on the substantive products
liability law of the st-'tes.
180. Id.; see Owen, supra note 178, at 1664.
181. See PRODUCTS LIABILiTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 177, § 2 cmt. d.
182. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (explaining that whiskey and tobacco are
unreasonably dangerous only if they are more dangerous than reasonably contemplated by an ordinary
consumer possessing common knowledge of their dangerous characteristics); see also Owen, supra
note 178, at 1666 (noting that "the ability of consumers to perceive and control the risk" in a
particular product is but one of the factors to consider in deciding if a product design is safe enough).
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addictive nature, this type of attack on a cigarette's design should be especially
effective.
The problem of a smoker's personal choice remains a consideration under the
Third Restatement's approach to design defectiveness; however, the consumer's
knowledge is merely one factor weighed by the court in its broad balance of risks
and benefits.'84 The implications of addiction should effectively negate any
detrimental effect that such bogus "choices" would have in weighing such factors.
Additionally, the consumer may have known that smoking imposed some risk, but
he may not have known the severity of the risk. Even if a plaintiff knew the severity
of the risk and chose to smoke anyway, his claim might not fail because the risk-
utility balance seems to tilt so clearly in the smoker's favor.
2. Consumer Expectations Test and Section 402A
Some judges have refused to adopt a risk-utility analysis, 8 ' and the Third
Restatement may not change their views. However, the recent developments affect
claims brought in jurisdictions that still adhere to the consumer expectations
doctrine of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.,86
The consumer expectations test precludes recovery ifa plaintiffhad knowledge
of the risks posed by a product and proceeded to use it regardless of such risk. 7
This doctrinal hurdle proved to be the death knell of many cases in the second wave
of tobacco litigation, because evidence of the addictive nature of nicotine and the
tobacco industry's knowledge of such was not known at that time. If a plaintiff
began smoking before warning labels were placed on cigarettes in 1966, the smoker
could argue that he or she neither understood nor appreciated the risks inherent in
cigarettes. Once the smoker became addicted to nicotine, he or she was unable to
stop smoking even after fully becoming aware of the risk. Thus, the addiction factor
effectively negates the assumption of risk defense and provides a basis for design
defectiveness under the consumer expectations test. Recognizing the weakness of
the plaintiffs' defenses, industry lawyers challenged any published report attempting
to establish addiction.' Considering the revelations in the Cigarette Papers and
similar documents, tobacco lawyers will now find it more difficult to rebut the
plaintiffs' addiction arguments. Thus, the tobacco industry's most vaunted defense,
assumption of risk, has been destroyed. This development opens the door to
numerous claims based on negligence and products liability.
184. The consumer expectation test, which was dispositive under § 402A, has been relegated to
a factor which courts should consider when making its risk-utility analysis under the Third
Restatement. See David Owen, Products Liability Law Restated, 49 S.C. L. REV. 273, 286-87 (1998).
185. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 402A (1965).
187. Id. cmt. n.
188. See GLANTZETAL., supra note 1, at 341.
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3. Failure to Warn
As stated earlier, failure to warn claims are not dead. Because the Supreme
Court left some room for such claims to survive preemption,'89 careful structuring
of a claim may avoid this defense. Most significantly, a plaintiff can bring a
federally based claim that the industry has not complied with the 1965 and 1969
Acts." Though the industry has complied with the literal requirements of the Acts
by placing specified warnings on its ads and packages, the industry's public actions
have directly conflicted with the spirit of the law. 9' The labeling law exists to
provide effective warning to consumers of the dangers of smoking, but the industry
has spent years creating a false controversy over causation in an effort to negate the
mandatory warnings. Such conduct is in direct conflict with the intent and purpose
behind the warnings. "
Plaintiffs can also base claims on state consumer protection acts. If such a
statute requires a manufacturer to release information about dangers from its
product to certain state agencies, a failure to do so constitutes negligence. The
Supreme Court recognized the viability of this type of claim in Cipollone. '93 The
Court stated that the 1965 and 1969 Acts did not usurp all of a state's police power,
thus maintaining protection for state-defined rights. 94 Therefore, failure to warn
claims are still viable when brought under state consumer protection acts.
4. Minor Incapacity
An emerging theory concerning minor incapacity and newly discovered
evidence that the tobacco industry targeted minors in its advertising campaigns may
provide yet another counter-argument to the assumption of risk defense. The
concept of minor incapacity-the inability of a young person to rationally make
important and informed decisions-has a long-standing history in American law.'95
This issue is important in tobacco litigation because most smokers began their habit
during adolescence or pre-adolescence." 6 A number of recent law review articles
have explored this aspect of tobacco litigation in terms of the assumption of risk
defense. 97 The theory is that ifa person was so young that he or she could not make
189. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 520-31 (1992).
190. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
191. Jason Crawford, Note, Overcoming Tobacco Company Immunity: Cipollone Clears an
Uncertain Path, 27 GA. L. REV. 253, 272 n.125 (1992).
192. Id.
193. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 528.
194. Seeid. at 330-31.
195. See generally Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (providing an in-depth history and
discussion of the minor incapacity doctrine).
196. Marc Z. Edell, Cigarette Litigation: The Second Wave, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 90, 102
(1986).
197. See Karen E. Meade, Breaking Through the Tobacco Industry's Smoke Screen, 17 J.
1998]
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a rational decision to smoke based upon an understanding of the dangers of
smoking,'98 the smoker cannot be held accountable for his actions or choices.' 9 Of
course, the argument still exists that a person who continued to smoke after he or
she came of age and developed the capacity to understand the danger assumed the
risks inherent in smoking; however, such an argument runs headlong into the
addiction rebuttal.
Adding fuel to the fire, recently discovered documents reveal that tobacco
companies targeted minors in advertising campaigns. A memo from R.J. Reynolds
which recently surfaced discussed the importance of eighteen-year-olds in
advertising campaigns."' No state allows the sale of cigarettes to minors, yet the
tobacco industry has continued to target minors in their advertising campaigns. This
behavior demonstrates their desire to prey upon the inability of children to make
informed decisions concerning smoking. If a plaintiff started smoking at an age
when he or she could not be expected to understand the consequences in response
to ads directed at him or her by the industry, and then he or she became addicted,
the plaintiff would seemingly have only involuntarily accepted the risk inherent in
smoking.
C. Intentional Torts
Causes of action based on the tobacco industry's intentional misrepresentation
and conspiracy to defraud may prove to be the most effective of any claim. The
revelations in industry documents concerning the special projects division of the
CTR (formerly TIRC) detail a consistent and prolonged practice of concealment and
deceit by the industry. This type of evidence may well support claims for punitive
damages, which adds an additional threat to the industry. Considering the effects the
documents will likely have on ajury's attitude toward the tobacco industry, ajury
may utilize a punitive damages award to show its disdain for the industry's flagrant
indifference for consumer safety.2"'
Claims of conspiracy and fraud were left unscathed after Cipollone, 2 and,
thus, remain available for a plaintiff to use. The Cigarette Papers contain ample
evidence of a conspiracy, at least among the managing executives at B&W. °3 The
materials concerning the CTR also reflect collusion among the different tobacco
LEGAL MED. 113 (1996); Crawford, supra note 191.
198. Meade, supra note 197, at 139.
199. See Crawford, supra note 191, at 280.
200. See J.. Reynolds Called 18 Year-Olds 'Critical' to Cigarettes' Success, WALL ST. J.,
July 11, 1996, at B6. In addition, the Liggett documents and admissions offer conclusive proof that
such targeting took place. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
201. See generally David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74
MICH. L. REv. 1257 (1976) (exploring the use of punitive damages and its compatibility with
products liability litigation).
202. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
203. See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
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companies which would seem to lay the foundation for an industry-wide
conspiracy."' Judge Sarokin's language in the Haines case rang loudly and
honestly about the deceptive practices of the tobacco industry." 5 A conspiracy
claim, supported by the right documentary evidence, would appear to hold
substantial promise in breaking through the industry's previous coat of immunity.
A plaintiffclaiming misrepresentation must pay heed to Cipollone, but that case
is not an absolute bar to these claims. The Court left open claims based on the
tobacco companies' omissions of material fact. For over thirty years, the industry
concealed the conclusive link between cancer, smoking, and the pharmacologically
addictive nature of nicotine, all three of which are easily characterized as material
fact. Carefully pleaded claims should thus effectively circumvent a preemption
defense by the tobacco lawyers, and if supported by sufficient documentary
evidence, these claims should also have a good chance of succeeding at trial.
The obvious defense to claims of fraud and misrepresentation is lack of
reliance. If the plaintiff did not detrimentally rely on the industry's deceit, he cannot
recover damages." 6 This lack of reliance is, at least in terms of tobacco litigation,
a quasi-assumption of risk defense. If the plaintiff knew smoking was dangerous
and, therefore, paid no heed to the false claims of the tobacco companies, the
plaintiff failed to detrimentally rely on the companies' assertions. Yet once again,
the industry is trying to play both sides of the court. Why would the industry spend
so much money creating this false controversy if it thought the resulting confusion
would have no effect? In any event, a plaintiff may encounter difficulty in proving
detrimental reliance.
However, two alternative approaches may succeed. First, a plaintiff must
properly frame the question of reliance. The question is not whether the plaintiff
relied on the deceit in deciding to smoke; rather, the question is whether he or she
would have decided to smoke if he or she knew what the industry knew about the
addictiveness and carcinogenity of cigarettes. Second, a plaintiff must define
reliance on a subconscious level. Rose Cipollone's argument serves as a good
example. Mrs. Cipollone argued that she relied on the false controversy created by
the industry as rationalization to continue smoking.2 7 Though at some level she was
aware that smoking was harmful, she used the industry's false statements as an
excuse to continue to smoke in good conscience. Should this form of reliance
satisfy the requirements of fraud and misrepresentation? The author is uncertain;
however, considering the change in attitudes that the new revelations will likely
spawn, juries and courts may choose to look favorably upon certain creative
applications of conventional doctrine.
204. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
205. Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 140 F.tRD. 681 (D.N.J. 1992).
206. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 525 (1965).
207. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1491 (D.N.J. 1988).
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D. The Moral High Ground
The most critical change caused by the industry documents in the recent
tobacco litigation will be a shift in positions on the moral high ground. In the past,
juries refused to grant relief to plaintiffs who knowingly and willingly exposed
themselves to the risks of smoking. The revelations in industry documents showing
the industry's concealment and fraud regarding both addiction and carcinogenity
should drastically change jury attitudes. The ability of tobacco lawyers to assail the
character of the plaintiff in the name of causation has been effectively undermined.
Evidence of the industry's conclusive knowledge that smoking causes cancer
severely weakens its arguments against causation. While defense lawyers will
continue to attempt such tactics, the causation argument has an increased potential
to backfire. In the recent case of Carter v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Co., a
Florida jury awarded $750,000 in damages to the plaintiff."' Interviews with jury
members after the verdict illustrated the shift in attitudes against tobacco compa-
nies. Because the tobacco lawyers attempted to degrade the plaintiff's character,
a common litigation tactic used in previous cases, the jurors thought the defense
lawyers were abusive in their examination of the plaintiff."' Instead of creating a
disdain for the plaintiff, the evidence of B&W's own bad deeds and concealment
backfired against B&W and prompted the jury to find for the plaintiff.
In addition, the tobacco lawyers can no longer rely on the federal labeling acts.
The evidence concerning the industry's knowledge and its subsequent concealment
and misrepresentation prohibits attorneys from arguing that tobacco companies
exhausted every means of warning consumers. In Carter, the jurors stated that the
industry "told lies" and approached the trial with "crass hypocrisy."'2 0 Tobacco
executives' public comments have only worsened matters. In a videotaped
deposition of Robert Heimann, the former CEO of American Tobacco Company,
he stated under oath that he was more qualified than the Surgeon General to testify
about the addictive nature of cigarettes, which he claimed was non-existent.21' The
public will increasingly view tobacco companies as stereotypical evil corporations.
The symbolic removal of section 402A, comment i immunity for tobacco by the ALI
in May, 1997, is indicative of this perception.2 2 The possibility of a favorable jury
verdict for the defense in such a posture is minimal.
The industry documents are critical to this shift in the moral high ground. In
another recent case captioned Connor v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co., a Floridajury
rejected a smoker's claims against the tobacco giant.2 3 The judge did not allow




212. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
213. See Laura T. Barrow, Why My Jury Let R.J. Reynolds Off, WASH. POST, May 25, 1997, at
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industry documents to be admitted into evidence, and the effect was decisive. The
forewoman of the jury noted that the key issue was addiction. She stated the
attorneys for the smoker "had claimed that Reynolds 'targets' a certain amount of
tar and nicotine needed to sustain addiction-what they called the 'Secret of Salem.'
[The tobacco industry scientist] said the company didn't. Whom to believe?"2 4
Although the jury wanted to punish the cigarette manufacturer, it could not find its
way around the law.2"' If the judge had admitted into evidence industry documents
which clearly showed the intentional manipulation of nicotine, the jury would likely
have ruled for the plaintiff.
E. The Global Settlement
The most important event in the history of tobacco litigation occurred on June
20, 1997. On this date, the tobacco industry and the states' Attorneys General
reached an end to their lengthy negotiations and presented a global settlement to
begin a new era in the sale, promotion, and regulation of cigarettes." 6 The scope of
the global settlement is such that Congress must approve it before it takes effect.
Though the eventual acceptance of the settlement is not certain, its effect on tobacco
litigation will be monumental.
Under the settlement proposal, the tobacco industry agrees to pay $368.5 billion
over the next twenty-five years. 7 They also agree to place large warnings on
cigarette packages which state that cigarettes are nicotine-delivery devices and
cause cancer, '21 to consent to FDA regulation of cigarettes, 29 and to make available
all industry documents relating to cigarette research by establishing a public
resource depository of all such documents.no In addition to making research
documents available, the industry agrees to allow a three-judge panel to review all
documents requested in discovery in future actions to which the industry has claims
of privilege?2 This panel will review the documents in question, without the usual
prima facie requirement which accompanies a challenge to privilege, and determine
the claims of privilege in camera. If the panel finds that the industry has not made
a valid claim of privilege in good faith, the panel may assess fines against such
claimant.'
In return for its concessions, the industry obtains extensive immunity from
future lawsuits. Under the settlement, plaintiffs cannot commence further state
214. Id. (emphasis added).
215. See id.
216. Proposed Resolution (visited Jan. 18, 1998) <http://stic.neu.edu/settlement/6-20-
settle.htm> [hereinafter GLOBAL SETTLEMENT].
217. Id. tit. VI.
218. Id. tit. I.B.
219. Id. tit I.E.
220. Id. app. VIII.
221. Id. app. VIII § 3.
222. GLOBAL SETLEMENT, supra note 216, app. VIII § 3.
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claims for Medicare reimbursement, smoker class action suits, or punitive damages
claims.' Only tort claims brought by individual smokers will be allowed, and only
compensatory damages may be awarded. In addition, a cap of 33% of the annual
industry-based payment limits the amount of compensatory damages which will be
paid each year.224 If a claimant receives an award in excess of one million dollars,
the excess is rolled over to the next year.225 The settling tobacco companies will
share all payments. 6
The settlement makes clear that the tobacco industry does not plan to enter a
courtroom again in defense of its product. Two key provisions make this result
obvious. First, any money not paid under the cap will be allocated to various health-
oriented entities by a President-appointed Commission. 7 Second, the industry will
pay all defense costs. 8 The industry will not pay extravagant legal fees to defend
lawsuits in which, if it wins, it will pay damages regardless. The industry has
calculated the amount of money it can afford to pay in compensatory damages and
conceded that amount in the settlement.
The most probable future for tobacco litigation under the settlement is a quasi-
administrative procedure in which a smoker must make sufficient allegations to
survive a 12(b)(6) motion and then negotiate a settlement. Unsurprisingly, the same
lawyers and firms that helped negotiate the settlement may represent the majority
of future tobacco claimants. Under the proposed settlement, these firms will be able
to service hundreds of clients, filing the requisite claims and obtaining their
contingency fees with very little legal maneuvering. If approved by Congress, the
Global Settlement may be the saving grace for the tobacco industry and a windfall
for the anti-tobacco lawyers.
Considering the enormous scope of the Global Settlement, the inevitable
bipartisan bickering which will accompany any Congressional consideration of its
terms, and the expressed apprehension of many prominent figures involved with its
ultimate approval, the settlement will not likely pass through Congress in its current
form. For instance, some Congressmen do not agree with the settlement's handling
of FDA regulation. 9 Under the settlement, the industry has five years before the
FDA can exercise full regulation over cigarettes."0 Yet, in a recent legal victory, the
FDA obtained full regulatory authority over cigarettes." ' The five year grace period
seems to be a concession by the Attorneys General. Additionally, Congress has
223. See id. tit. VIII.A § 1.
224. Id. tit. VIII.B § 9.
225. Id.
226. Id. tit. VIII.B § 4.
227. Id. tit. VIII.B § 10.
228. Id. tit. VIII.B § 11.
229. Comments from Congressmen Henry Waxman (D-CA) and Ron Wyden (D-OR), Tobacco
Settlement Agreement, (C-SPAN television broadcast, June 20, 1997).
230. GLOBAL SETTLEMENT, supra note 216, tit. I.
231. See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 958 F. Supp. 1060 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
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clarified that it will revise the settlement as it sees fit before granting approval.2
If enough changes are made, the industry may not agree to comply, thus killing the
proposal. As a result, the future of the Global Settlement is far from certain.
The general public will not know impact of the Global Settlement for some
time. Whether it will be the virtual end to tobacco litigation as we have known it or
a footnote in the eventual bankruptcy of a powerful American industry is yet to be
seen. Any in-depth analysis of the Global Settlement at this stage would be pure
speculation and would better be addressed in an article devoted to the Settlement
alone. Until this proposal is validated by Congress, it has no effect on individual tort
claims for compensatory and punitive damages.
V. CONCLUSION
Throughout the long history of tobacco litigation, the tobacco industry has been
virtually immune to tort claims brought by smokers. However, recent developments
are likely to bring an end to the industry's long-enjoyed immunity from liability.
The Supreme Court's partial rejection of the preemption defense and the discovery
of damaging new evidence of the industry's deceitful and exploitive design and
marketing techniques appear to have turned the tide against the industry. Both the
Liggett and Global Settlements show that the industry is no longer willing to fight"
until the bitter end. The plaintiffs lawyers who decimated the asbestos industry have
now joined the battle against the tobacco industry, and hundreds of smokers have
sought representation in response to a plaintiff s recent victory in a Florida court.
Tobacco companies have targeted minors, created a false controversy over
causation, and hid nicotine's addictive nature from the public for thirty years.
Armed with this evidence, a plaintiff may be able to prove the industry is one
hundred percent at fault, a feat which seemed impossible a mere ten years ago.
However, the industry may avoid justice once again. The Global Settlement
appears to be the tobacco industry's last desperate attempt to avoid the tsunami of
claims looming in the wake of the Cigarette Papers and the Liggett Documents. The
Global Settlement may be the industry's saving grace. If approved in its current
form, the Global Settlement may prevent another tobacco trial. The cost seems
phenomenal, yet it represents only about twenty-five percent of the industry's
income. Determining the settlement's fate in the United States Congress is
impossible; yet, the chances of it being approved unscathed is minimal. If the
Global Settlement is not approved by Congress, perhaps the tobacco industry will
soon learn the justice of the American tort system.
Tucker S. Player*
232. See supra note 229.
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